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How Evidence of 
Subsequent Remedial Measures Matters 
 




Federal Rule of Evidence 407 prohibits plaintiffs from introducing evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures to show that the defendant is to blame.  
Among its purported justifications, the rule prevents hindsight bias from un-
duly influencing jury decisions.  Nonetheless, plaintiffs often take advantage of 
the rule’s numerous exceptions to introduce evidence of remedial measures for 
other purposes (e.g. to prove feasibility).  Fearing that the exceptions could 
swallow the rule, some courts will even exclude evidence that fits into one of 
these exceptions because it is ostensibly too prejudicial.  Alternatively, other 
courts instruct juries that they should only use the evidence for the limited per-
missible purpose, but not for proving blameworthiness.  
This complex scheme makes several assumptions about how evidence of 
remedial measures and the accompanying limiting instructions influence ju-
ries.  Although many studies have examined hindsight bias in other contexts, 
and one older study looked at Rule 407 in particular, these studies typically 
used short, written vignettes with small sample sizes.  Moreover, none of these 
studies examined how subsequent measures impact damages.  We sought to 
test these concepts in robust fashion by conducting two separate experiments 
using videos that included rich fact patterns including arguments from both 
parties and jury instructions.  In the end, over one thousand seven hundred 
mock jurors rendered verdicts on liability, contributory negligence, and dam-
ages. 
As expected, evidence of subsequent remedial measures helped plaintiffs 
win more often.  But surprisingly, our results also suggested that taking reme-
dial measures may lower damages, thereby counteracting the increased liabil-
ity findings.  We also studied the efficacy of two limiting jury instructions.  In 
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one experiment, a limiting instruction with an explanation reduced but did not 
eliminate the effects of evidence of subsequent remedial measures.  The instruc-
tion with explanation was also consistently more effective than the simple lim-
iting instructions, but these results were not statistically significant.  We hy-
pothesize about the potential reasons for our various results and discuss what 
they mean for policymakers, litigants, and future researchers that may wish to 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 (“Rule 407”) prohibits plaintiffs from in-
troducing evidence of subsequent remedial measures to show that the defend-
ant is to blame.1  Among its purported justifications, the rule prevents hindsight 
bias from unduly influencing jury decisions.2  Nonetheless, plaintiffs often take 
advantage of the rule’s numerous exceptions to introduce evidence of remedial 
measures for other purposes (e.g. to prove feasibility).  Fearing that the excep-
tions could swallow the rule, some courts will even exclude evidence that fits 
into one of these exceptions because it is ostensibly too prejudicial.3  Alterna-
tively, other courts instruct juries that they should only use the evidence for the 
limited permissible purpose, but not for proving blameworthiness.4  
This complex scheme makes several assumptions about how evidence of 
remedial measures and the accompanying limiting instructions influence juries.  
Although many studies have examined hindsight bias in other contexts, and 
one older study looked at Rule 407 in particular, these studies typically used 
short, written vignettes with small sample sizes.  Moreover, none of these stud-
ies examined how subsequent measures impact damages.  We sought to test 
these concepts in robust fashion by conducting two separate experiments using 
videos that included rich fact patterns with arguments from both parties and 
jury instructions.  In the end, over one thousand seven hundred mock jurors 
rendered verdicts on liability, contributory negligence, and damages.  
As expected, evidence of subsequent remedial measures helped plaintiffs 
win more often.5  But surprisingly, our results also suggested that taking reme-
dial measures may lower damages, thereby counteracting the increased liability 
findings.6  We also studied the efficacy of two limiting jury instructions.  In 
one experiment, a limiting instruction with an explanation reduced but did not 
eliminate the effects of evidence of subsequent remedial measures.  The in-
struction with explanation was also consistently more effective than the simple 
limiting instructions, but these results were not statistically significant.  We 
hypothesize about the potential reasons for our various results and discuss what 
they mean for policymakers, litigants, and future researchers that may wish to 
explore this subject in more depth. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I explains Rule 407 and its un-
derlying justifications.  In brief, the rule prohibits the introduction of evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures to show culpability.  The thinking behind the 
rule is that hindsight bias causes juries to give too much weight to evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures, a result that would be unfair to defendants.  
  
 1. FED. R. EVID. 407. 
 2. Id. at advisory committee notes to 1972 proposed rule.  
 3. Dan M. Kahan, The Economics – Conventional, Behavioral, and Political – of 
“Subsequent Remedial Measures” Evidence, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1616, 1628 (2010). 
 4. WRIGHT ET AL., 23 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 5291 (2d ed. 2019). 
 5. See infra Part III.2.E. 
 6. Id.  
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However, the rule is riddled with exceptions that allow the evidence to be used 
for other purposes.  But even when an exception applies, some courts will not 
admit the evidence of subsequent remedial measures because it is overly “prej-
udicial.”  Other courts issue limiting instructions to the jury telling them that 
they can use the evidence for one purpose but not another.  This complex 
scheme makes several assumptions about the effect of evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures and limiting instructions.  Part I then goes on to explain that 
few studies have examined how Rule 407 affects decision-making.  To the ex-
tent that studies do exist, they have only considered liability decisions.  No 
studies have looked at how evidence of remedial measures might affect deci-
sions on damages. 
Part II then explains our first experiment (the staircase experiment).  In 
this negligence case, the plaintiff hurt herself falling down overly steep stairs.  
We created five versions of this case, cumulatively layering on a new manipu-
lation for each subsequent version: basic case (version 1); defendant argued 
that it was not feasible to make the staircase safer (version 2); plaintiff intro-
duced evidence that the defendant later added landing (version 3); judge pro-
vided a simple limiting instruction (version 4); and judge explained the reason 
for the limiting instruction (version 5).  For each of these versions, we asked 
mock jurors to determine liability and if applicable, contributory negligence 
and damages. 
Part II then describes the results of the staircase experiment.  As expected, 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures increased plaintiff’s win rate.  The 
limiting jury instructions with explanation reduced liability findings, while a 
simple instruction trended in the same direction but was not statistically signif-
icant.  We did not observe any significant damages effects, but the limiting 
instruction with explanation appeared to be trending lower.  We only mention 
the null damages findings because of the more significant results found in our 
second experiment. 
Part III then explains our second experiment (the snowboard experiment).  
In this products liability case, the plaintiff was hurt during a snowboarding ac-
cident.  He sued the snowboard manufacturer for a defective design.  While we 
manipulated this case in two dimensions, four basic versions of this case are 
relevant to this article.7  Again, we cumulatively layered on a new manipulation 
for each subsequent version: the defendant argued that it made the design as 
safe as it could while retaining the ability for customers to choose different 
bindings (version 1); plaintiff introduced evidence that the defendant later 
made a safer design (version 2); judge provided a simple limiting instruction 
(version 3); and judge explained the reason for the limiting instruction (version 
4).  Again, mock jurors were asked to determine liability and if applicable, 
contributory negligence and damages. 
Part III then describes the results of the snowboard experiment.  Like the 
staircase experiment, the snowboard experiment confirmed that evidence of 
  
 7. See infra note 122 describing the other “low anchor” manipulation.  
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subsequent remedial measures increased plaintiffs’ win rate.  Although the im-
pact was smaller than we saw in experiment 1, it was still sizable and statisti-
cally significant.  Interestingly, when the mock jurors saw evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures, the plaintiff’s win rate increased, but net damages 
(raw damages discounted for findings of contributory negligence) decreased.  
Although the causal mechanism is unclear, we hypothesize that jurors thought 
the defendant’s decision to take remedial measures made the defendant less 
blameworthy and therefore deserving of smaller damages.  Because liability 
and damages went in opposite directions, we saw no statistically significant 
differences between any of our scenarios when we examined the case expected 
value.  This effect was only present in the snowboard case.  This suggests that, 
at least in some cases, evidence of subsequent measures may not harm defend-
ants as much as previously thought. 
Additionally, while the limiting instruction with explanation appeared to 
lower liability findings, that result was not statistically significant in the snow-
board experiment.  Moreover, the simple limiting instruction appeared to have 
no effect whatsoever.  Finally, in Part IV, we describe implications of these 
different findings and the limitations of our study. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Federal Rule of Evidence 407 
Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the introduction of 
subsequent remedial measures to prove blameworthiness in negligence and 
products liability cases, but the rule allows such evidence to be admitted for 
other reasons, including to prove the feasibility of such remedial measures.8  
Most states have identical or substantially similar rules to the federal rule.9  Alt-
hough the rule was originally limited to cases involving claims for negligence, 
many state courts began applying this rule to products liability cases, which is 
  
 8. FED. R. EVID. 407. (“When measures are taken that would have made an earlier 
injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admis-
sible to prove: negligence; culpable conduct; a defect in a product or its design; or a 
need for a warning or instruction. But the court may admit this evidence for another 
purpose, such as impeachment or – if disputed – proving ownership, control, or the 
feasibility of precautionary measures.”).  This paper uses the term “blameworthiness” 
to refer to all four issues where evidence of remedial measures is inadmissible.  
 9. Mark G. Boyko & Ryan G. Vacca, Who Knew – The Admissibility of Subse-
quent Remedial Measures When Defendants Are Without Knowledge of the Injuries, 38 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 653, 657–58 (2007); DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A 
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 2.3.4 (2018) 
(discussing the acceptance of the rule throughout the country); but see R.I. R. EVID. 407 
(specifically allowing evidence of subsequent remedial measures).  
7
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a strict liability tort.10  In 1997, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 followed suit, 
adding language that also prohibited the use of evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures to prove “a defect in a product or its design; or a need for a 
warning or instruction.”11  Many, but not all, states have expanded the rule to 
products liability.12 
There are two articulated justifications underlying Rule 407.  First, the 
rule encourages accused defendants to take steps to improve safety without fear 
that these steps will be used against them in court.13  Second, and perhaps more 
controversially, some commentators have questioned the probative value of 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures.14  While there is widespread agree-
ment that the evidence would be admissible to show blameworthiness under 
the liberal rules of relevance found in contemporary evidence rules, commen-
tators disagree on just how probative the evidence is.15  Some suggest that such 
evidence has almost no value.16  In contrast, others believe that the evidence 
tends to suggest negligence or a product defect.17  Regardless of which side 
  
 10. See Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1522 (1st Cir. 1991); In re 
Joint E. Dist. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 995 F.2d 343, 
345 (2d Cir. 1993); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981); Kelly v. 
Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir. 1992); Werner v. Upjohn, Inc., 628 
F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Ala. Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 
883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 
230, 232 (6th Cir. 1980); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 
1984); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 636–37 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 11. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment.  
 12. See Raymond, 938 F.2d at 1522; In re Joint E. Dist. & S. Dist. Asbestos 
Litig., 995 F.2d at 343; Cann, 658 F.2d at 60; Kelly, 970 F.2d at 1275; Werner, 628 
F.2d at 857; Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 888; Bauman, 621 F.2d at 232; Flaminio, 733 
F.2d at 469; Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 636–37; see also LEONARD, supra note 9, at § 2.6.6. 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note to 1972 amendment (discussing 
the “social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from 
taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.”).  
 14. Id.; see also Kahan, supra note 3, at 1628. 
 15. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it has any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the issue 
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.  Even the notes to Rule 
407 acknowledge that it is “possible” to infer blameworthiness from remedial 
measures.  FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note to 1972 amendment. 
 16. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in 
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 617 (1998) (“subsequent remedial measures are al-
most irrelevant to a determination as to whether the defendant was negligent with re-
spect to the initial accident.”); see also Leonard, supra at 9 at § 2.3.1 (discussing various 
cases disagreeing on the relevance of subsequent remedial measures). 
 17. Kahan, supra note 3, at 1633 (arguing that “the adoption of a preventive meas-
ure after an accident is more consistent with the conclusion that it would have been 
reasonable to adopt it before the accident than with the conclusion that it would not 
8
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they take, everyone worries that jurors will give too much weight to evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures and thereby ignore contrary exculpatory evi-
dence.18 
This latter concern is rooted in the tendency of individuals to use hind-
sight bias in their decision-making: 
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been an-
ticipated in foresight.  They not only tend to view what has happened as 
having been inevitable but also to view it as having appeared ‘relatively 
inevitable’ before it happened.  People believe that others should have 
been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case.19 
When assessing negligence or product liability claims, the jury must de-
cide if the defendant acted either negligently or created an unreasonable risk of 
harm that the defendant should have recognized at the time of his or her con-
duct.20  The problem is that a jury cannot truly view the conduct “at the time” 
it occurred, but rather, must assess the conduct after they have knowledge that 
the conduct caused an injury.  Hindsight bias is an inherent problem with tort 
litigation because jurors know that there was an unexpected injury and are 
looking for someone to blame.21  The introduction of subsequent remedial 
measures can exacerbate this bias.22  Jurors might mistakenly construe such 
evidence as an admission or proof of guilt when, in fact, making something 
even safer does not necessarily mean that the prior precautions were unsafe or 
unreasonable to begin. 
By prohibiting evidence of remedial measures, Rule 407 appears to elim-
inate the possibility that evidence of those measures will lead to hindsight 
bias.23  This outcome is consistent with views of those who believe evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures have no, or at least a minimal, tendency to 
  
have been reasonable to adopt it at that time”); see also Maggie Wittlin, Hindsight Ev-
idence, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1333–44 (2016) (using both Bayesian reasoning and 
reasoning by inference to explain generally the relevance of hindsight evidence). 
 18. Kahan, supra note 3, at 1623 (discussing concern that a factfinder will overes-
timate the likelihood that a subsequent remedial “measure could have been gauged be-
fore the accident.”); Rachlinski, supra note 16, at 617–18 (approving the rule excluding 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures). 
 19. Baruch Fischoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Bi-
ases in Hindsight, in JUDGEMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman, 
Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (describing the way in which humans at-
tempt to use the past to make predictions in the future).     
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282, cmt. g (1965). 
 21. See generally Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post  Ex Ante: De-
termining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995) (finding that when 
participants knew of an adverse outcome, they were more likely to find that the conduct 
taking place prior to the injury was unreasonable). 
 22. Id. 
 23. FED. R. EVID. 407. 
9
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show blameworthiness.24  However, if evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures has some probative value, the concern is that jurors will give the ev-
idence too much weight.  Under this view, the rule may be too blunt an instru-
ment.25  As Dan Kahan has argued, excluding the evidence entirely may be an 
overcorrection.26  In other words, while allowing the evidence may result in 
jurors overestimating liability because of hindsight bias, excluding that evi-
dence may result in jurors underestimating liability by taking away relevant 
information from their consideration. 
The rule’s significant exceptions further complicate this picture.27  Evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible for the purpose of im-
peachment or, if disputed, proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of pre-
cautionary measures.28  Trial attorneys can manipulate witnesses to take ad-
vantages of these exceptions.29  Two real world examples illustrate this phe-
nomenon.  In Martinez v. WR Grace & Company,30 the plaintiff was injured 
when she failed to see a bump in a grocery store parking lot and tripped over 
it.31  She argued that the defendant was to blame because the bump was not 
painted a different color.32  The defendant’s safety manager testified that the 
bump’s natural coloring was sufficiently different from the rest of the paved 
parking lot to allow the plaintiff to see it.33  However, the safety manager also 
testified that if the color had not been different they would have painted it.34  
After the accident occurred, the defendant painted the bump yellow.35  As a 
result, the court found that evidence of subsequently painting the bump was 
  
 24. Id. at advisory committee’s note to 1972 amendment. 
 25. Kahan, supra note 3, at 1634. 
 26. Id. (arguing that evidence of subsequent remedial measures in some cases “jus-
tif[ies] revising upward an estimate of substandard conduct on the part of the defend-
ant.”).  
 27. Leonard, supra note 9, at § 2.9 (stating that “Counsel bent on exposing the jury 
to subsequent repair evidence will often be able to fit the evidence into one of the 
broadly construed alternative purposes.”) (citation omitted); Stephen D. Easton, The 
Real World Rules of Evidence, 7 PRAC. LITIG. 49, 56–57 (Jan. 1996) (suggesting that 
because of the rule’s exceptions, “[s]ubsequent remedial measures are almost always 
admitted”).   
 28. FED. R. EVID. 407. 
 29. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 3, at 1626 (describing how a plaintiff’s attorney 
can manipulate a witness into either conceding that the defendant’s conduct was unrea-
sonable or opening the door to allow introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures). 
 30. 782 P.2d 827 (Colo. App. 1989). 
 31. Id. at 828.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 829.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/5
2019] SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES 619 
admissible, not to prove negligence, but to impeach the safety manager’s testi-
mony that the bump did not need to be painted.36  Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying 
Service also illustrates how easy it is to introduce evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures by impeachment.37  In Herndon, the Tenth Circuit found that 
a defendant’s refusal to opine or testify as to the feasibility of a safety precau-
tion essentially controverted feasibility, and thus, opened the door to the ad-
missibility of subsequent remedial measures.38 
Concerned that the exceptions can swallow the rule, courts use two tactics 
to prevent this from occurring.  First, they often narrowly construe Rule 407’s 
exceptions.39  For example, in Bauman v. Volkswagen Aktieengesellschaft,40 a 
defective design of a car door was alleged to have caused the plaintiff’s in-
jury.41  The plaintiff sought to introduce evidence that the defendant redesigned 
the doors after the accident.42  The defendant stated that the redesign occurred 
simply to comply with new government regulations.43  Since Volkswagen 
never affirmatively controverted the feasibility of an improved design, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the admission of subsequent 
remedial measures was inappropriate.44  Under this view, it appears that evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures is only admissible to impeach claims 
that an improved design was not feasible.  In other words, a defendant must 
actively controvert feasibility for the exception to apply.45  But the text of Rule 
407 suggests that “impeachment” and “if disputed” are two separate reasons 
why evidence of subsequent remedial measures can be introduced.46  The 
Volkswagen analysis collapses these two reasons into a single exception. 
Second, even when one of Rule 407’s exceptions appears to apply, courts 
have relied on Rule 403 to exclude evidence of remedial measures, finding the 
evidence more prejudicial than probative.47  Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
states that the court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed” by the danger of such things as unfair prejudice or 
misleading the jury.48  The Advisory Committee’s notes suggest that Rule 403 
  
 36. Id. (explaining that evidence of subsequent remedial measures was permissible 
for impeachment purposes). 
 37. Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983). 
 38. Id. at 1329 (explaining subsequent remedial measure implemented by defense 
to be redesigning a pitch trim switch, which modifies the planes altitude). 
 39. Kahan, supra note 3, at 1627. 
 40. 621 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 41. Id. at 232. 
 42. Id. at 233. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 91 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Rule 407 requires 
that the feasibility of precautionary measures be controverted.”). 
 46. FED. R. EVID. 407. 
 47. Kahan, supra note 3, at 1628. 
 48. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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was “designed as a guide for the handling of situations for which no specific 
rules have been formulated.”49  The Rules that follow, like Rule 407, “are con-
crete applications evolved for particular situations.”50  These comments plainly 
suggest that there is no need to consider Rule 403 if a more specific Rule ap-
plies.  Nevertheless, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explic-
itly said that courts should look at both Rule 403 and 407 together to determine 
whether evidence of remedial measures should be admitted.51 
Finally, if the court admits evidence of remedial measures, the rules of 
evidence entitle a defendant to a limiting jury instruction.52  This instruction 
explains how the jury should use the evidence.53  Namely, they can consider 
the evidence for any of the issues outlined in Rule 407’s exception, but never 
to show culpability.54  The specific instruction given by the judge can vary 
depending on the state or even the judge.  Notably, instructions generally do 
not explain the purpose of the rule.55  Rather they simply tell the jury how to 
use the evidence.  One exemplar states, 
Certain evidence has been admitted in this case for only a limited pur-
pose. This [evidence consists of ___ and] may be considered by you 
only for the purpose of ___. It may not be considered for any other pur-
pose. Any discussion of the evidence during your deliberations must be 
consistent with this limitation.56  
In short, Rule 407 and its exceptions are premised on three beliefs: (1) 
defendants will be more willing to take remedial measures if the evidence can-
not be used against them later on;57 (2) evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures will lead to hindsight bias, thereby causing juries to overestimate 
blameworthiness;58 and (3) limiting instructions will effectively counter any 
  
 49. Id. at advisory committee’s note to 1972 amendment (discussing the need for 
an exclusion where certain circumstances give rise to “an undue tendency to suggest 
decision on improper basis.”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2002); 
see also Cyr v. J.I. Case Co., 652 A.2d 685, 694 (N.H. 1994) (suggesting that even if 
evidence of subsequent repairs would be admissible under Rule 407, Rule 403 should 
be applied without regard to the policies that support 407). 
 52. WRIGHT, supra note 4, at § 5291 (stating, “If the court decides that exclusion 
is not required under Rule 403, the defendant is entitled, upon request, to an instruction 
limiting the use of evidence of remedial measures to one of the permissible purposes.”). 
 53. Soo Yeon Ahn, Friendly Limiting Instructions, 52 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 353 
(2018). 
 54. Id. at 354. 
 55. Id. at 355.  
 56. 6 Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI. 1.06 (6th ed.). 
 57. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee notes for 1972 proposed rules.  
 58. Id.  
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/5
2019] SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES 621 
hindsight bias.59  For those who think evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures is relevant, the flip side of the second premise is that juries may un-
derestimate blameworthiness if not exposed to the evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures.  To the extent these beliefs relate to how juries do and do not 
make decisions, these beliefs can be tested experimentally.  Of course, this ex-
periment will not answer questions about whether Rule 407 encourages reme-
dial measures.  Nonetheless, understanding how jurors view evidence of sub-
sequent remedial measures should aid policymakers in assessing the value of 
Rule 407 and its exceptions. 
B.  Prior Studies 
Although several studies have looked at the issue of hindsight bias in legal 
decision-making,60 we are only aware of one study that specifically examined 
how the various issues associated with Rule 407 affect jury decision-making.61  
Stephen Landsman and Richard Rakos had both real judges and mock jurors 
read short, written vignettes that involved exposure to subsequent remedial 
measures.62  While the primary purpose of the study was to determine whether 
judges were able to resist biasing information better than jurors, the study also 
provided some insight into the effect that subsequent remedial measures had 
on jury decision-making.  The study found that mock jurors were more likely 
to find the defendant liable when the jurors were exposed to evidence of sub-
sequent remedial measures.63  Interestingly, the authors grouped both jurors 
that had been told that the evidence was admissible with those that were told 
that the evidence was objectionable and thus should be “disregarded.”64  
  
 59. Ahn, supra note 53, at 365. 
 60. See, e.g., Bernard Chao et al., Why Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, 
Bias, and Technology, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (2018); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the 
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 818 (2001); Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judg-
ments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Dam-
ages, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 609–10 (1999); Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 21, 
at 98. 
 61. See MICHAEL J. SAKS ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
EVIDENCE LAW 78 (2016) (stating they were unaware of any “empirical research” test-
ing the different theories on Rule 407 decision-making). 
 62. Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect 
of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 113, 114 (1994). 
 63. Id. at 122, 124 (Table 3 showing that 91% (31/34) of the mock jurors found 
the defendant liable when not exposed to evidence of subsequent remedial measures 
compared to 68% (45/66) of mock jurors that were exposed to evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures (p <.03)).  We performed our own analysis using confidence inter-
vals and found that the 23% difference (CI: 5.7% to 36%) in verdict rate was indeed 
significant. 
 64. Id. at 122. 
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To examine the effectiveness of limiting instructions, we performed an-
other line of analysis with Landsman & Rakos’ data.  Specifically, we com-
pared the verdicts of the mock jurors who had been exposed to the evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures and not told to disregard the evidence against 
those who were told to disregard the evidence.65  Although the 9% reduction 
in verdict rate suggests that the sustained objection could reduce the effect of 
the evidence of subsequent remedial measures, we calculated a 95% confidence 
interval showing that Landsman & Rakos’ results were consistent with any-
where between a 15% increase in verdict rate to a 32% reduction in verdict 
rate.  Because the confidence interval crossed zero, the results were not statis-
tically significant.  Thus, the study did not have enough power (i.e. number of 
subjects in the experiment) to prove that sustaining the defendant's motion 
made the small observed difference. 
We also sought to determine whether the sustained objection might neu-
tralize the effect of exposure to evidence of subsequent remedial measures.  
Comparing the jurors that were never exposed to evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures to those exposed but with a sustained defense objection, we 
found that they were statistically insignificant (confidence interval: -2% to 
38%).  Thus, even though there was an 18% difference in verdict rate, we can-
not be sure that this difference was not due to sheer randomness.  Again, this 
suggests the study was underpowered.  Nonetheless, the range of the confi-
dence intervals, mostly above zero, suggests that granting the defendants' mo-
tion fails to fully neutralize the effect that exposure to evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures had on the mock jurors.  In short, Landsman & Rakos results 
suggest that a sustained objection helps ameliorate, but not eliminate, the effect 
of exposure to subsequent remedial measures.  But, there was insufficient data 
to be confident in that conclusion. 
As is common to many studies of that era, the study had several serious 
limitations.  The stimulus was short: two or three written paragraphs depending 
on the experimental condition.66  This potentially exaggerated the effect of the 
few arguments that were present.  The sample consisted of volunteers from the 
Cuyahoga County jury pool in Ohio.67  Thus, it is unclear whether the findings 
apply to other populations.  Additionally, as discussed above, the sample size 
  
 65. 73% (24/33) of mock jurors who were told that the evidence was inadmissible 
(i.e. ignore the evidence) found the defendant liable while 64% (21/33) of jurors that 
were told that evidence was admissible found the defendant liable. 
 66. Landsman & Rakos, supra note 62, at 120. 
 67. Id. at 120, 122 (the paper initially states that there are 104 jurors, but it only 
reports 100 responses). 
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was small (n=100) making it difficult to draw conclusions confidently.68  Fi-
nally, the study only looked at liability, not damages.69  While logically, evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures should only affect liability, other stud-
ies have repeatedly found that the two issues have unexpected interactions.70 
Both judges and commentators have been extremely skeptical of the ef-
fectiveness of limiting jury instructions.71  But David Sklansky has challenged 
this view and argued that such instructions work, although imperfectly.72  With 
this belief in mind, he advocates for engaging in the “messy but important task 
of assessing when evidentiary instructions are most likely to fail, how they can 
be made more effective . . . .”73 Although not the main focus, this Article takes 
up Sklasnky’s call and seeks to experimentally evaluate the efficacy of differ-
ent jury instructions associated with Rule 407. 
Others have already begun this work.  In one study, Shari Diamond and 
Jonathan Casper found that jury instructions were more effective when accom-
panied by an explanation of their purpose.74  The Casper & Diamond study 
involved a simulated antitrust price-fixing case.75  In antitrust cases, the jury 
awards compensatory damages and the judge trebles (3x) those damages to ar-
rive at the final award.76  If jurors know that trebling will occur, they may be 
tempted to reduce their damages award.77  The experiment was designed to 
  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. See infra Part II and Part III.  
 71. See Krulewitch v. United States. 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome, by instruc-
tions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.” (citation omit-
ted)); SAKS, supra note 61, at 102 (“The overwhelming conclusion from empirical re-
search on the ability (or willingness) of jurors to follow instruction to use evidence for 
a limited purpose is like that for disregarding evidence – instructions fail to accomplish 
their purpose and can even backfire, making the forbidden use more influential than 
had no instruction been given.”); see also Roselle L. Wissler et al., On the Inefficacy of 
Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 
9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 38 (1985); Joel D. Lieberman et al., Understanding the Limits 
of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instruc-
tions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence. 6 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 677–78 (2000). 
 72. David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 407, 408–09 (2013) (arguing that evidentiary instructions work imper-
fectly). 
 73. Id. at 409. 
 74. Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Ver-
dict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 513, 
515 (1992) (noting most courts, and by virtue those court’s rules, regard jurors as pas-
sive participants to the trials they decide). 
 75. Id. at 517. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
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assess, among other items, whether different instructions to ignore trebling 
were effective.78  In one version, jurors were admonished to disregard the tre-
bling provision, but they were not given any explanation for the instruction.79  
In another version, an explanation accompanied the jury instruction.80  The lat-
ter scenario resulted in significantly higher damages.81  This suggests that ex-
planations can make limiting instructions more effective.  We attempted to rep-
licate Diamond and Casper’s findings in a different context – the limiting in-
structions typically associated with Rule 407. 
C. Damages  
In addition to examining liability decisions, our two experiments sought 
to assess whether evidence of subsequent remedial measures affected the 
amount jurors awarded.  Landsman and Rakos only studied liability effects, 
and at first blush, this choice seems logical.82  After all, evidence of what the 
defendant did after an accident should not affect how juries view the gravity of 
the plaintiff’s injury or what damages should be awarded to compensate for 
that injury. 
But several studies have shown that liability evidence affects damages 
decisions, and conversely, damages evidence often affects liability decisions.  
Roselle Wissler et al. referred to this as “fusion.”83  Initially, we had no hy-
pothesis for how evidence of subsequent remedial measures might affect dam-
ages.  We only asked mock jurors to assess damages because one of the authors 
previously observed unexpected fusion effects in prior works.84  But as we an-
alyzed the results and observed that damages appeared to decrease when evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures were introduced, we looked for an ex-
planation and developed the following hypothesis. 
Jurors may award lower damages when the defendant takes subsequent 
remedial measure to address the cause of plaintiff’s injury because the defend-
ant is less morally blameworthy.  Several studies have shown that higher dam-
ages are awarded when the evidence of defendant’s liability actions are 
  
 78. Id. at 521. 
 79. Id. at 523. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 534 (detailing t=-2.63, p<.01). 
 82. Landsman & Rakos, supra note 62, at 120. 
 83. Roselle L. Wissler et al., The Impact of Jury Instructions on the Fusion of 
Liability and Compensatory Damages, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 125–39 (2001). 
 84. See John Campbell et al., Time is Money: An Empirical Assessment of Non-
Economic Damages Arguments, 95 WASH U. L. REV. 1,  26 (2017) (finding that char-
acterizing plaintiff’s injury in granular time units increased plaintiff’s likelihood of pre-
vailing on liability); John Campbell et al., Countering the Plaintiff’s Anchor: Jury Sim-
ulations to Evaluate Damages Arguments, 101 IOWA L. REV. 543, 562 (2016) (observ-
ing that plaintiff’s prevailed on liability slightly less often when they asked for an out-
rageously high damages award). 
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stronger.85  Mock juries appeared to punish blameworthy defendants with 
higher damages awards.86  The Hans-Reyna gist based model of decision-mak-
ing explains a potential mechanism for this phenomenon.87  The model sug-
gests that once jurors determine damages are warranted, they will make ordinal 
gist judgment about the amount of damages appropriate (e.g. low or high).88  
As part of this process, jurors will consider the defendant’s blameworthiness 
(e.g. degree of negligence).89 
Evidence of remedial measures might work this way too, but in reverse.  
In some sense, the defendant is “doing the right thing” by taking steps to pre-
vent others from being injured.  Juries might find the defendant to be less 
blameworthy and reduce damages accordingly.  From a legal perspective, this 
result would be illogical.  The gravity of the plaintiff’s injury is unaffected by 
any subsequent remedial measures.  What’s more, these steps are taken after 
the conduct that led to the original injury.  But from a psychological perspec-
tive, it is natural for jurors to use this information to assess the blameworthiness 
of the defendant and award damages based on that determination. 
D.  Hypothesis 
We seek to test several assumptions associated with Rule 407.  Our four 
primary hypotheses are: 
(1) Underlying Justification for Rule 407: The win rate for the plaintiff 
will increase when evidence of subsequent remedial measures is introduced. 
(2) Simple Limiting Jury Instruction: A simple limiting jury instruction 
will not affect the jury’s decision on liability. 
  
 85. See, e.g., John M. Darley & Charles W. Huff, Heightened Damage Assessment 
as a Result of the Intentionality of the Damaging-Causing Act, BRITISH J. OF PSYCH. 
29, 181–88 (1990) (showing higher damages when defendant’s actions were more in-
tentional); Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the 
More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts. APP. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 
526 (1996) (finding clearer evidence of the danger of birth control pills caused jurors 
to give higher damages); Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project. 38 
NEB. L. REV. 744, 760 (1959) (finding clearer evidence of liability led to higher com-
pensatory damages). 
 86. See Darley & Huff, supra note 85, at 181–88; Chapman & Bornstein, supra 
note 85, at 526; Broeder, supra note 85, at 760.  
 87. Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to 
Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 
126 (2011). 
 88. Id. at 129–30. 
 89. Valerie F. Reyna et al., The Gist of Juries: Testing a Model of Damage Award 
Decision Making, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 280, 291 (2015) (describing an exper-
iment where jury perceptions of negligence predicted damages awards). 
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(3) Limiting Jury Instruction with Explanation: Limiting jury instruc-
tions that explain the basis for the instruction will reduce the effect of introduc-
ing evidence of subsequent remedial measures more than simple limiting jury 
instructions with no explanation. 
(4) Fusion of Liability with Damages: When evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures is introduced, jurors will award lower damages.  
Others have suggested that the best practice for researchers is to use mul-
tiple scenarios to test the same phenomena.90  We follow that practice by testing 
our hypotheses using two experiments, a premises liability case where the the-
ory of liability is based on a claim for negligence (“the staircase lawsuit”),91 
and a products liability case where the plaintiff relies on strict liability theory 
(“the snowboard lawsuit”).92 
II. EXPERIMENT 1: PREMISES LIABILITY 
In our first experiment, we performed a 5x1 between-subjects experi-
ment93 using Amazon Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”), an online crowd-sourcing 
marketplace.94  We loosely modeled our first experiment after the events in 
Duncan v. Mill Management Company, a premises liability case.95  In our ex-
periment the plaintiff, Mackenzie Dunn, was a resident of Skyline Vista Apart-
ments.  Ms. Dunn was injured falling down a set of steep stairs leading to the 
building’s basement.  Arguing that the stairs were too steep, she sued the build-
ing’s manager, Mesa Management, for negligence. 
In order to test the different assumptions associated with Rule 407, we 
created five variations of this basic case.  Each variation consisted of three 
PowerPoint presentations, one each for the presiding judge (with both an open-
ing explanation of the dispute and jury instructions that followed the attorneys’ 
arguments), the plaintiff’s attorney, and the defendant’s attorney.  Using three 
different voices, we then recorded arguments for each slide.  The result was 
  
 90. See Krin Irvine, David A. Hoffman, & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Law and Psy-
chology Grows Up, Goes Online, and Replicates, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 320, 
346 (2018) (suggesting that “researchers ought to show that the same results appear in 
response to different stimuli.”). 
 91. See infra Part II. 
 92. See infra Part III.  
 93. A between-subjects experiment means that each participant is only assigned to 
one condition.  
 94. MTurk has become a large and robust platform for social science research, 
with proven reliability through the replication of many known results. See Irvine et al., 
supra note 90, at 322, 344 (concluding that Amazon MTurk provides a reasonable sub-
ject pool for experiments in law and psychology); Adam J. Berinsky et al.,  Evaluating 
Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 
POL. ANALYSIS 351, 362–63 (2012) (stating the authors successfully replicated three 
experiments using MTurk). 
 95. 60 A.3d 222, 230 (Conn. 2013). 
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five videos lasting approximately fifteen to seventeen minutes.  Like real ju-
rors, the mock jurors were asked to render verdicts on liability, and, if applica-
ble, contributory negligence and damages.96  Subsequently, the mock jurors 
were asked several debriefing questions.97 
A.  Scenario 1: The Basic Case 
In this case, the plaintiff, MacKenzie Dunn, fell down a flight of stairs 
and brought a lawsuit for negligence against her apartment building, Mesa 
Management.  Ms. Dunn’s attorney pointed out that the stairs were so steep 
that they violated some of the surrounding cities’ building codes.  In addition, 
a previous tenant suffered a similar accident on the same set of stairs.  Yet, the 
defendant did nothing.  The plaintiff’s injuries included a fractured left ankle 
that required surgery.  She also complained about pain, suffering, and loss of 
enjoyment of her life.  Altogether, the plaintiff requested damages in the 
amount of $280,000: $80,000 for her medical expenses and $200,000 for her 
pain and suffering. 
In response, the defendant, Mesa Management, explained that the stairs 
complied with the building code that actually governed the location of the 
building.  Mesa Management’s expert also pointed out that the stairs would 
have complied with the other jurisdictions’ building codes the plaintiff refer-
enced because those codes did not apply to older stairs like those at issue.  The 
defendant also argued that Ms. Dunn’s own negligence was to blame for her 
fall.  With respect to damages, the defendant did not challenge the $80,000 in 
medical expenses, but it did argue that $200,000 for pain and suffering was far 
too much given that the plaintiff had healed quickly and could do almost all of 
the activities she had done before. 
B.  Scenarios 2 and 3: Not Feasible & Remedial Measures  
Scenarios 2 and 3 were designed to test a basic premise of Rule 407: how 
does evidence of remedial measure affect jurors’ decisions of liability?  All of 
the evidence and arguments found in scenario 1 are also found in scenarios 2 
and 3.  However, in scenarios 2 and 3, Mesa Management relied on one more 
argument.  Specifically, the defendant’s attorney argued: 
[b]ecause of the limited space surrounding the stairs in the basement, it 
would not have made any sense to add a landing in the middle of the 
  
 96. Our mock judge instructed the jury “Mesa Management claims that Mackenzie 
Dunn’s own negligence contributed to her injuries. To succeed on this defense, Mesa 
Management must prove both of the following: (1) that Mackenzie Dunn was negligent; 
and (2) that Mackenzie Dunn’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing her inju-
ries.” See Cal. Jury Instruction 405. 
 97. To prevent these questions from affecting responses on the primary outcomes 
of interest, participants could not return to the jury verdict after seeing the debriefing 
questions. 
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staircase or change the angle.  If you look at the picture of stairs just 
after Ms. Dunn’s fall, you can see it just was not feasible to retrofit the 
stairs as Ms. Dunn’s expert would have you believe.  There was simply 
not enough room.  The stairs were as safe as they could have possibly 
been. 
This argument opened the door for Rule 407’s impeachment exception.  
We presented this evidence without impeachment in scenario 2.  However, in 
scenario 3, the plaintiff had a rebuttal after the defendant’s argument.  In the 
rebuttal, the plaintiff used evidence of subsequent remedial measures to im-
peach the feasibility argument.  Specifically, the plaintiff showed that the de-
fendant later took steps to make the stairs less steep.  These arguments and the 
corresponding diagrams were introduced in scenario 3, but they were also 
found in scenarios 4 and 5.   
In short, scenario 2 allowed us to make a baseline measurement and ob-
serve how much weight mock jurors gave to defendant’s argument that reme-
dial measures were not feasible.  Presumably, that argument should help the 
defendant persuade jurors that it was not liable.  Scenario 3 then determined 
whether evidence of subsequent remedial measures would counter the argu-
ment of feasibility or perhaps overwhelm the feasibility by swinging the case 
dramatically in the plaintiff’s favor. 
Importantly, the evidence of subsequent remedial measures in this exper-
iment was introduced in a separate rebuttal that served to disprove the defend-
ant’s argument that there was no way to make the stairs safer.  Thus, any dif-
ferences we observed between scenario 2 and 3 may have been due to a com-
bination of the tendency for evidence of subsequent remedial measures to show 
the defendant should have taken remedial actions earlier and the fact that this 
evidence makes the defendant appear less credible. 
C.  Scenarios 4 & 5: Limiting Jury Instructions  
Scenarios 4 and 5 tested the efficacy of different limiting instructions.  
Scenarios 4 and 5 both contained all the arguments and evidence found in Sce-
nario 3.  However, they also contained different limiting instructions that a 
judge may give to a jury.  In scenario 4, the judge stated: 
The jury needs to understand what this evidence may and may not be 
used for.  The evidence regarding the remedial measures taken by Mesa 
Management after the earlier accident is not to be used to find negli-
gence.  Rather, it is only allowed to challenge defense counsel’s argu-
ment that a safer design was not feasible. 
This instruction was given to jurors directly after the evidence of the sub-
sequent redesign of the stairs was presented.  In other words, like a real trial, 
the judge instructed the jury in the middle of plaintiff’s case.  A similar instruc-
tion was also given at the end of the trial with the final jury instructions.  At 
that time, the judge said: 
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During the trial, I told you that evidence of remedial measures was be-
ing admitted for the limited purpose of challenging the defendant’s ar-
gument that a safer design was not feasible.  You must consider it for 
that purpose only and may not consider it as evidence of negligence. 
These instructions were similar to the instructions given in Duncan v. Mill 
and were very much like the standard limiting jury instruction given in many 
jurisdictions.98 
Scenario 5 tested a version of the slightly more elaborate jury instruction 
recommended by Diamond & Casper.  In scenario 5, the standard instructions 
were given with one addition.  Here, the judge gave a brief explanation for Rule 
407.  He stated: 
We have this rule because we want to encourage people to fix problems 
and the law will not use evidence of such fixes against them later in 
court. 
This explanation came twice, once directly after the presentation of the 
evidence and then again during the general jury instruction.  Notably, the in-
struction did not mention Rule 407’s second justification – namely, the risk 
that the jury will give too much weight to the evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures.  The second experiment included this rationale.  Thus, scenario 4 
and 5 allowed us to test the effect of two possible limiting jury instructions. 
D.  Respondents 
We recruited subjects from the population of workers on Amazon Me-
chanical Turk in September 2017 and established an initial screen for those that 
were “jury eligible” (i.e. residents of the United States over age 18 who could 
read, write, and speak English).  Subjects were paid $2.50 to complete the ex-
periment online.  All subjects gave consent in accordance with the Institutional 
Review Board requirements.  At the beginning of the survey, subjects filled out 
a demographic questionnaire. 
1,189 participants started the experiment participant’s data.  After dis-
qualifying participants for failing attention checks or providing inconsistent re-
sponses, 981 participants remained.99  This sample was nearly a 50/50 split 
  
 98. Duncan, 60 A.35 at 237. 
 99. Of the 207 participants who were not included in our analyses, 108 were elim-
inated due to participants failing to answer the attention check question correctly.  An-
other seventeen participants were discarded for answering that the defendant was not 
negligent then answering that the defendant was a substantial part in causing the acci-
dent.  Two more participants were discarded because they answered that the plaintiff 
was not negligent but that she was a substantial part in causing the accident.  These 
answers indicated to us a confusion about what was needed to prove liability and were 
discarded to ensure our data was not contaminated.  
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between males and females with males representing 49% and females repre-
senting 51%.  The sample was younger, more educated, and more politically 
liberal than the population at large; gender, race, and median income, however, 
were more representative of the U.S. Census data.100 
E.  Results 
The results of each simulation are presented below in Table 1.  The de-
scriptive statistics found in Table 1 provide a general sense of our results but 
do not indicate how reliable or significant our results are.  We also calculated 
95% confidence intervals and performed basic t-tests to answer those questions 
and have included that analysis in the text.  In addition, we performed a series 
of regression analyses and included some of the most important ones in the 
appendix. 
Table 1 describes the win rate for plaintiffs as well as the mean, median, 
and standard deviation for damages when the jurors awarded the plaintiff dam-
ages and the mean, median, and standard deviation for the entire experiment, 
including when jurors decided in favor of the defendant. 
1.  Liability (Staircase) 
Looking first at liability, we found that evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures increased liability findings.  Limiting jury instructions appeared to 
reduce this effect, but they did not eliminate it.  The descriptive statistics are 
found in Table 1 below.  In scenario 1, the control scenario, mock jurors 
awarded the plaintiff verdicts in 47.3% of the cases.  In scenario 2, the defend-
ant argued that it was not feasible to redesign the stairs.  The win rate for the 
plaintiff increased slightly to 48.7% over scenario 1, but this was not statisti-
cally significant.  Surprisingly, these results suggest that the defendant’s argu-
ment that redesigning the staircase was not feasible did not help the defendant. 
Evidence of remedial measures was introduced in scenario 3.  The win 
rate increased by 20.1% over scenario 2 to 68.8%.  In scenarios 4 and 5, differ-
ent limiting jury instructions were introduced.  In scenario 4, the judge used the 
basic limiting instruction and the plaintiff’s win rate dropped to 60.3%.  In 
scenario 5, the judge used the longer limiting instruction that provided an ex-
planation for Rule 407.  The results were very similar to scenario 4, but the 
effects were slightly larger.  The plaintiff’s win rate dropped to 57.6%.   
  
 100. Specifically, the sample demographics are as follows: 51% female, mean and 
median age 38 and 36, 78% white, 10% African American, 8% Asian, 2% American 
Indian or Alaskan Native, and the remainder classified as other; the median income was 
between $30,000 to $49,999; and medical education was a Bachelor’s Degree, and 53% 
leaned toward, or strongly preferred Democrats while 38% leaned toward or strong 
preferred Republicans. 
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Table 1 
Staircase Experiment, Liability 
 





1. Control 201 95 47.3% 
2. Not Feasible 197 96 48.7% 
3. Evidence of SRM  186 128 68.8% 
4. Simple J-Instr. 204 123 60.3% 
5. J-Instr. w/ explanation 191 110 57.6% 
 
Although the descriptive statistics provide an intuitive sense of our liabil-
ity findings, we also performed rigorous logistic regression analyses control-
ling for relevant demographics.101  The size of the effects changed modestly.  
But more importantly, we were able to determine which effects were statisti-
cally significant.  We used scenario 3 as the baseline case because it allowed 
us to examine the effect of both subsequent remedial measure (2 vs. 3) and 
different jury instructions (3 vs. 4 and 3 vs. 5).  In our model, the plaintiff’s 
win rate for that was 68.7% (p=0.000019).102  The difference between scenario 
2 and 3 was significant.  The odds of plaintiff winning decreased by .417 when 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures was not present (p=.000048).  When 
it was present, the introduction of a simple limiting instruction in scenario 4 
appeared to reduce the plaintiff’s win rate (odds ratio .700 to 1), but these re-
sults were not statistically significant (p=.098).  When we introduced a limiting 
instruction that included an explanation of Rule 407, the size of the effect was 
larger than that for the simple jury instruction and statistically significant (odds 
  
 101. See App. A.  We added demographics to our model whenever they had a sta-
tistically significant effect in either the staircase or snowboard experiments with respect 
to any of the dependent variables we report on.  This allowed us to contrast de-
mographics findings.  The only demographic that affected liability in the staircase ex-
periment was income.  For every increase in our income scale, we found that the odds 
of plaintiff winning on liability decreased (odds ratio .812 to 1, p=.002).  
 102. See App. A (showing an odds ratio of 2.1987 translates to 68.7 % chance of 
the event occurring).  
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ratio .61 to 1, p=0.0022).103  However, we should note that the differences be-
tween the two types of limiting instructions (scenarios 4 and 5) were not statis-
tically significant.  Finally, we found statistically significant income effects.  
As mock jurors’ incomes increased on a six-point scale, the plaintiff won less 
often (odds ratio .81 to 1, p=002).104 
2.  Damages (Staircase) 
Because the ultimate damages a plaintiff actually receives can be reduced 
if the plaintiff is found to be contributorily negligent, our experiment also 
measured the various factors that make up the damages a plaintiff actually re-
covers.  Those factors are the raw damages award, the rate at which the plaintiff 
was found contributory negligent, and the percentage of fault that was allocated 
to the plaintiff in those cases. 
We first looked at raw damage awards without any discount for contrib-
utory negligence in Table 2 below.  To do so, we excluded all cases in which 
the defendant won.  In scenario 1, the average damages award was $177,947.  
As manipulations were layered on in scenarios 2-4 (defendant arguing that re-
medial measures was not feasible, adding evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures, adding a short limiting jury instruction), the average damages re-
mained essentially unchanged.  However, when the jury was given a more de-
tailed limiting jury instruction explaining the basis for Rule 407, the average 




 103. See App. A.  
 104. Respondents were asked whether their household income was: 1) less than 
$10,000, 2) $10,000 to $29,999, 3) $30,000 to $49,999, 4) $50,000 to $99,999, 5) 
$100,000 to $199,999 or 6) $200,000 or more. 
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Table 2 
Staircase Experiment: 






Raw Damages Case Ex-
pected 
Value Mean SD 
1. Control 95 8 $177,947 $76,820 $86,363 
2. Not Feasible 96 7 $178,385 $73,196 $84,886 
3. Evidence of SRM 128 9 $177,848 $87,603 $120,108 
4. J-Instr (Short)  123 6 $181,094 $76,202 $108,102 
5. J-Instr w/explain 110 8 $164,045 $77,816 $92,762 
 
When we performed additional regression analysis our model suggested 
a similar decrease in raw damages, but the results did not reach statistical sig-
nificance (p=.189).  Likewise, when we calculated 95% bootstrap confidence 
intervals, the results also suggested lower damages but were not statistically 
significant.106 
Interestingly, our model did show statistically significant age effects.  For 
every year older the mock juror was, our regression analysis predicted that raw 
damages would increase by $1,258.107  We did not see a similar effect in ex-
periment two involving a snowboard accident. Apparently, older individuals 
  
 105. All figures are in U.S. dollars. Damages exclude zeros (i.e. defense verdicts), 
while case expected values include zeros.  
 106. For non-normal distributions, a bootstrapping algorithm is an appropriate 
method for calculating confidence intervals because it uses the observed distribution 
rather than assuming normality. See generally BRADLEY EFRON & ROBERT TIBSHIRANI, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOTSTRAP 45, 113, 183 (1993).  In this case, the 95% con-
fidence interval predicted that damages in scenario 5 would be between $34,036 less 
than scenario 2 (no remedial measures) and $6,240 more than scenario 2. Because the 
range crosses zero, these results confirm that our findings are not statistically signifi-
cant.  
 107. The 95% bootstrap confidence interval confirmed this effect predicting that 
damages would increase from $572 to $1,882. 
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determined that the injury caused by falling down stairs deserved more money 
than younger people. 
We do not report on any effects of contributory negligence in our experi-
ment 1.  Findings of contributory negligence ranged between a low of six in 
scenario 4 to a high of nine in scenario 3.  These small numbers made any 
calculations unreliable. 
3.  Case Expected Value (Staircase) 
Finally, we report on case expected value.  Case expected value takes into 
account the damages for both the defense verdicts and the verdicts for the plain-
tiff.  Defendant’s wins are treated as zero dollars.  For plaintiff wins, we took 
the raw damages award and reduced the damages for contributory negligence 
if applicable.  As one might expect, the trends appear to track the liability ef-
fects.  As illustrated in Table 2, the basic case (scenario 2) has a case expected 
value at $84,886.  When evidence of subsequent remedial measures was intro-
duced (Scenario 3) the value increased to $120,108.  The case expected value 
with the simple limiting instruction then went back down to $108,102.  That 
decrease was more substantial when the limiting instruction with explanation 
was used, decreasing to $92,762. 
We did further analysis to determine if these trends were statistically sig-
nificant.  Our regression analysis predicted that the introduction of subsequent 
remedial measures increased case expected value by $36,288.  The results were 
significant (p=.00066).108  While the simple limiting instruction reduced this 
effect, it did not totally eliminate the effect of the subsequent remedial 
measures.  The case expected value was still $25,624 higher than scenario 2 
(no subsequent remedial measures) (p=.014).109  When the limiting instruction 
with explanation was used (scenario 5), the case expected value almost re-
turned to its initial value.  The case expected value of scenario 5 was only 
$7,958 more than Scenario 2, and this difference was not statistically meaning-
ful (p=.45).110 
4.  Summary (Staircase) 
In short, our first experiment confirmed intuitions about how evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures affects liability while also suggesting that lim-
iting instructions may ameliorate those effects.  First, as expected, evidence of 
  
 108. The 95% bootstrap confidence interval also showed that the case expected 
value was between $14,948 and $57,628 larger when subsequent remedial measures 
were introduced (Scenario 2 vs. 3).  
 109. The 95% bootstrap confidence interval shows a similar increase in value of 
from $5,087 to $45,598.   
 110. The 95% bootstrap confidence interval shows that the case expected value for 
Scenario 5 is likely to between $11,213 less valuable and $28,401 more valuable than 
Scenario 2.  
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subsequent remedial measures increased plaintiff’s win rate.111  Keep in mind 
that in this experiment evidence of subsequent remedial measures was intro-
duced in a manner that directly challenged the defendant’s credibility.  So, 
there may have been two mechanisms at work: the tendency for the evidence 
to show that the defendant’s behavior was blameworthy, and damage to the 
defendant’s credibility.  Second, in this experiment, a limiting jury instruction 
with explanation reduced liability findings, while a simple jury instruction 
trended in the same direction but was not statistically significant.  Third, we 
did not observe any significant damages effects, but the limiting jury instruc-
tions with explanation appeared to be trending lower.  We only mention this 
observation because of the more significant results found in our second exper-
iment.  Because damages did not appear to be affected by our manipulations, 
our findings on case expected value tracked our findings on liability.  Finally, 
we observed some demographic effects.  Older people were more likely to 
award higher damages, and those with higher income were less likely to find 
the defendant liable.  We suspect the former is likely unique to the facts of 
experiment one.  Older people are likely more concerned about falling down 
stairs than younger people.   
III.  EXPERIMENT 2: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
The results of any single experiment may be an artifact of the particular 
facts presented to the participants.  Consequently, we sought to replicate our 
initial results by testing Rule 407 in a second context with an entirely different 
fact pattern. 
We modeled our second experiment after a products liability case out of 
the state of Washington, Hyjek v. Anthony, which involved a snowboard acci-
dent.112  In Hyjek, the defendant, Anthony Industries, manufactured a snow-
board called the Dan Donnelly XTC, which had no pre-attached bindings and 
no pre-drilled holes put into the snowboard’s fiberglass.113  Without any pre-
attached bindings or pre-drilled holes, Anthony Industries hoped to give more 
freedom to purchasers in selecting a binding for their snowboard.114  The plain-
tiff purchased this snowboard and used the threaded screws to affix the bind-
ings of his choice to the Dan Donnelly XTC snowboard.115  While riding the 
snowboard down the mountain, the threaded screws allowed the binding to 
come loose and caused the plaintiff to lose control and crash.116  This crash 
  
 111. See supra Section II.E. (explaining why the defendant’s credibility could be 
playing a part in the increase in liability findings after evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures is admitted to prove previously controverted feasibility). 
 112. Hyjek v. Anthony Indust., 944 P.2d 1036, 1036–37 (Wash. 1997).  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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resulted in an injury to the plaintiff.117  After this accident, Anthony Industries 
redesigned the Dan Donnelly XTC snowboard to have pre-drilled core inserts 
to affix bindings to the board.118  
During the trial, the plaintiff attempted to present evidence of this subse-
quent redesign to the jury.119  Unlike in our experiment, the plaintiff did not 
argue that an exception to Rule 407 applied, rather the plaintiff argued that 
Rule 407 did not apply to strict products liability cases.120  The Supreme Court 
of Washington rejected the plaintiff’s argument and held that Rule 407 in fact 
does apply to strict products liability cases.121 
Our experiment used many of the facts mentioned above, but once again, 
we modified the details and created a fact pattern where subsequent remedial 
measures would be admitted into evidence.  In order to test the underlying 
premise of Rule 407 and the effect of limiting jury instructions in products 
liability cases, we created four variations of the same basic case.  Besides 
changing the basic facts, the experiment design also differed from our previous 
experiment.  Our basic scenario already contained an argument where the de-
fendant “opened” the door for the plaintiff to argue that it was entitled to intro-
duce evidence of subsequent remedial measures.  Specifically, Scenario 1 in-
cluded defendant’s argument that “the Carve 3000 was the safest board that X5 
was able to design that would allow for customers to select their own binding.”  
In Scenario 2, plaintiff introduced evidence of remedial measures in his case in 
chief, not as a rebuttal as was done in the staircase experiment.  Thus, scenarios 
1-4 of the snowboard experiment corresponded to scenarios 2-5 of the staircase 
experiment.  We also tested a different exception to Rule 407.  Whereas Ex-
periment 1 contained defendant’s claims of infeasibility and later impeaching 
that testimony, Experiment 2 simply allowed an argument regarding safety to 
be introduced in the plaintiff’s case in chief.122 
A.  Scenario 1: The Basic Case 
In our basic case, plaintiff, Connor McNeil, purchased a snowboard, the 
Carve 3000, from the defendant, X5 Company’s (“X5”).123  The Carve 3000 
  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 1042; see also WASH. EVID. R. 407. 
 122. We also tested a second unrelated issue in Experiment 2 which we call low 
anchoring.  Thus, our experiment had eight cells, 4 (Rule 407) x2 (low anchor).  In all 
the scenarios, the plaintiff asked for approximately $500,000 in non-economic dam-
ages, but in half the scenarios, the plaintiff also demanded $10,000 economic damages.  
There is reason to believe that the $10,000 demand may reduce the ability to obtain 
$500,000.  For this paper, we collapse scenarios with and without the low anchor to-
gether and report on our findings with respect to Rule 407.  
 123. All names used in our experiment are fictitious.  
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was designed for snowboarding experts that wanted the flexibility of selecting 
different bindings.  Consequently, the board did not have any predrilled holes.  
Unlike the real case, the liability issue did not focus on the proper type of 
screws, but instead involved the size of the hole that needed to be drilled into 
the snowboard.  The failure to drill the correct size made the snowboard unsta-
ble.  Further, in order to provide an opening for the plaintiff to introduce evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures, the defendant argued that its product 
was the “safest” possible that would allow the rider the freedom to pick his or 
her own bindings.124 
The plaintiff injured himself during his first run with the new snowboard.  
The parties agreed that the holes he drilled were too big, thereby making the 
board difficult to handle.  There was also evidence that X5 knew that this could 
be a problem.  A test rider had previously made the same mistake with less 
serious consequences. 
Mr. McNeil alleged that the Carve 3000 was defective for two reasons: 
(1) it was foreseeable that purchasers of the Carve 3000 would make mistakes 
drilling holes and injure themselves, and (2) X5 did not warn its customers of 
what would happen if the holes were not drilled properly.  Consequently, 
McNeil asked for $500,000 to compensate for his injuries.  Those injuries in-
cluded a concussion and tears of two ligaments in his knee.  While most of the 
damage was surgically repaired, Mr. McNeil was told that he would be unable 
to snowboard in the future. 
X5 denied that the failure to predrill holes made its product dangerous or 
required a warning and argued that the design with no pre-drilled holes was the 
safest and only design possible to allow the purchaser to choose any bindings 
they wanted.  Of course, this statement opened the door for the plaintiff to in-
troduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures to impeach this argument. 
Notably, unlike the staircase experiment where the theory of liability was 
based on negligence, Experiment 2 was a products liability case that relied on 
strict liability.  Thus, the jury was charged with slightly different decision – 
deciding whether the product was unreasonably dangerous. 
B.  Scenario 2: The Presentation of Subsequent Remedial Measures  
In Scenario 2, the plaintiff introduced evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures.  More concretely, the plaintiff explained that the defendant began 
using “different sized core-inserts” after the accident.  The different inserts still 
allowed the customer the freedom to choose different bindings, but customers 
no longer had to drill holes.  As a result, the mistake that caused the plaintiff’s 
injury was no longer possible.  The evidence was admissible because it contra-
dicted the defendant’s argument that the original Carve 3000 snowboard used 
the safest possible design.  
  
 124. As discussed earlier, attorneys can often manipulate a witness into making this 
argument. See supra note 29.   
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Unlike the staircase experiment, the evidence of remedial measures was 
introduced in the plaintiff’s case in chief.125  Thus, it did not serve to contradict 
the defendant’s argument in the same way as in the staircase experiment.  Ac-
cordingly, any differences between scenarios 1 and 2 are probably attributable 
to the tendency for the evidence to show that the defendant’s behavior was 
blameworthy and not to any damage done to the defendant’s credibility. 
C.  Scenarios 3 and 4: Limiting Jury Instructions 
Scenarios 3 and 4 added different limiting jury instructions.  However, 
unlike the first experiment, we did not interrupt the plaintiff’s presentation with 
the limiting instruction.  Instead, immediately after the plaintiff explained the 
subsequent remedial measures to the jury, the attorney stated, “I am only using 
this evidence to show that the defendant’s original design was not as safe as 
they could make it.  That is an argument that the defendant has raised.  But it 
is just not true.  They clearly made a safer design later.  I am not using this 
evidence to show that the original product was defective.”126 
Later, the judge gave a similar instruction to the jury at the end of the trial 
when he gave all of the jury instructions.  The visual in Figure 1 accompanied 
the instructions.  More specifically, the judge stated, “During his argument, 
Plaintiff’s counsel offered evidence that X5 redesigned its product to include 
holes and use core inserts.  This evidence was only admitted for the limited 
purpose of challenging the defendant’s argument that this defendant’s original 
design was the safest one possible.  You must consider it for that purpose only 
and may not consider it as evidence that the product was defective.”  These 
instructions were almost exactly the same as the instructions given in the prem-
ises liability case, which were modeled after the instructions given in Duncan 
v. Mill.127 
In Scenario 4, the judge then added his explanation for the limiting jury 
instruction by stating, “We have this rule for two reasons.  First, we have this 
rule because we want to encourage people to fix problems and the law will not 
use evidence of such fixes against them later in court.  Second, we are con-
cerned that the jury may overweigh evidence of remedial measures.  Although 
it may tend to show that the original version was defective, it is possible that 
companies can improve products that were not defective.”  This instruction was 
slightly different than the corresponding instruction given in Experiment 1.  In 
Experiment 1, the judge only used the first rationale to justify the instruction.  
The judge did not mention the possibility of hindsight bias. 
  
 125. See supra Section II.B.; see also Hyjek, 944 P.2d at 1037. 
 126. See App. C for the slide associated with the limiting instruction. 
 127. Duncan v. Mill Mgmt. Co. of Greenwich, 60 A.3d 222, 230 (Conn. 2013). 
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D.  Respondents 
We recruited subjects from the population of workers on Amazon Me-
chanical Turk in the spring of 2018 and established an initial screen for those 
that were “jury eligible” (i.e. residents of the United States over age 18 who 
could read, write, and speak English).  Subjects were paid $3.00 to complete 
the experiment online.  All subjects gave consent in accordance with the Insti-
tutional Review Board requirements.  At the beginning of the survey, subjects 
filled out a demographic questionnaire.   
864 participants started the experiment.  After disqualifying participants 
for failing to complete the experiment, failing attention checks, or providing 
inconsistent responses, 729 participants remained.  This sample was nearly a 
50/50 split between males and females with males representing 51.4%.  The 
sample was younger, more educated, and more politically liberal than the pop-
ulation at large; gender, race, and median income, however, were more repre-
sentative of the U.S. Census data.128 
E.  Results 
In Experiment 2, the defendant argued that it made its snowboard as safe 
as it could in every scenario.  Thus, unlike Experiment 1, there was no basic 
scenario where the defendant did not open the door to allow the plaintiff to 
introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measure.  Consequently, Scenario 
1 in Experiment 2 corresponded to Scenario 2 in Experiment 1.  Scenario 2 
corresponded to Scenario 3 of Experiment 1 and so on.  With that in mind, we 
report on our results. 
1.  Liability (Snowboard) 
As seen in Table 3, the plaintiff’s win rate was 33% in scenario 1.  Sce-
nario 2 introduced the evidence of subsequent remedial measures.  As it did in 
Experiment 1, plaintiff’s win rate increased.  Here, the increase was 11.7% 
resulting in a 44.7% win rate for the plaintiff.  Scenarios 3 and 4 introduced the 
simple and more detailed limiting instructions, respectively.  In Scenario 3, the 
simple limiting instruction appeared to do nothing to the win rate which re-
mained essentially unchanged (44.2%).  However, the plaintiff’s win rate 
dropped (5.8%) to 38.9% when the limiting instruction with explanation was 
introduced in scenario 4. 
  
 128. Specifically, the sample demographics are as follows: 49% female, 76% white, 
12% African American, 9% Asian, 1% American Indian or Native American, and the 
remainder classified as other; mean and median age 37 and 34 respectively; 54% lean 
toward or strongly prefer democrats with only 25% leaning or strongly preferring re-
publicans; the median education level for our sample was a bachelor’s degree; and the 
sample’s median income fell between $50,000–$99,999. 
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Table 3 
Snowboard Experiment, Liability 
 





1. Basic 176 58 33.0% 
2. Evidence of SRM  188 84 44.7% 
3. Simple J-Instr. 190 84 44.2% 
4. J-Instr. w/explanation 175 68 38.9% 
 
Again, we performed a logistic regression controlling for relevant de-
mographics to determine if the effects on plaintiff’s win rate were signifi-
cant.129  Introducing subsequent remedial measures in Scenario 2 increased 
plaintiff’s win rate (odds ratio 1.874 to 1).  This difference was significant 
(p=.0053).  A comparison of Scenarios 2 and 3 found that the simple limiting 
jury instruction did not have any effect on liability (odds ratio .936 to 1, p=.76).  
When we compared Scenarios 2 and 4, the effect size was larger, but still not 
statistically significant (odds ratio .787, p=.28).130 
We also combined our data from the two experiments to see if the added 
power would reveal an effect.  We used the scenarios where evidence of sub-
sequent remedial measures had been introduced without a jury instruction as 
the baseline case.  When a simple limiting instruction was added, the trend 
pointed in the hypothesized direction (a lower plaintiff win rate), but the results 
were not significant (odds ratio .824 to 1, p=.20).  However, when limiting 
instructions with explanation were added, there was a statistically significant 
decrease in plaintiff’s win rate (odds ratio .687 to 1, p=.014). 
Specific demographics also affected liability in the snowboard experi-
ment.  Men were less likely to find in favor of the plaintiff than women (odds 
ratio .487 to 1, p < .001).131  That may be because men are less willing to place 
blame on others when the injury is caused by a high risk activity like expert 
snowboarding.  But our experiment was not designed to delve into the reasons 
behind this unexpected effect, and we cannot be sure about the mechanism.  
Additionally, the analyses showed that two ethnic groups were more likely to 
  
 129. See infra app. B.  
 130. Id.  
 131. See infra app. B. 
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find liability than white mock jurors – African American mock jurors (odds 
ratio 2.07, p=.0029) and Asian mock jurors (odds ratio 1.798, p= .037) – but 
we do not have any hypotheses to explain these results.132 
2.  Raw Damages (Snowboard) 
Table 4 examines the different components of damages starting with raw 
damages.  Raw damages exclude defendant wins and do not discount for find-
ings of contributory negligence.  A comparison of scenarios 1 and 2 suggests 
that evidence of subsequent remedial measures might decrease raw damage 
awards.  In scenario 1, the average plaintiff’s damage award was $310,465.  
When evidence of subsequent remedial measures was introduced in scenario 2, 
the average award dropped to $259,446.  Perhaps, mock jurors viewed the de-
fendant more favorably (i.e., as a better corporate citizen) when it took correc-
tive action.  That view could manifest in reduced damage awards. 
  
  
 132. Id. 
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Table 4 
Snowboard Experiment: 






% CN Raw Damages Case  
Expected 
Value Mean SD 
1. Basic 58 18 31.0% $310,465 $192,556 $91,851 
2. Evid. 
of SRM 
84 39 46.4% $259,446 $182,554 $98,567 
3. Simple 
J-Instr 
84 40 47.6% $258,762 $180,295 $94,718 
4. J-Instr 
w/explain 
68 20 29.4% $312,934 $170,942 $108,744 
 
Our regression analysis suggested that raw damages decreased by 
$55,612 when subsequent remedial measures were introduced in scenario 2, 
but these results were just short of statistical significance (p=.076).  Because 
the damage data was not normally disturbed, we also calculated bootstrap con-
fidence intervals.  That analysis gave us similar results, predicting that there 
was a 95% chance that raw damages in scenario 2 would be between $116,266 
lower to $10,782 higher than scenario 1.  Because this range crossed zero by a 
small amount, these results were also just short of statistical significance.  The 
simple jury instruction in scenario 3 did not change these results in any mean-
ingful way.  The model showed that raw damages in scenario 3 were $54,055 
less than scenario 1, but these results were short of statistical significance again 
(p=.085).134  Somewhat unexpectedly, the more complex limiting instruction 
in scenario 4 appeared to return raw damages back to the value they had in 
scenario 1.  The model showed that raw damages would be $3,548 less in sce-
nario 4 than in scenario 1.  This number was statistically meaningless 
(p=.91).135 
  
 133. All figures are in U.S. dollars. Damages awards over $500,000 are transformed 
to $500,000. Damages exclude zeros (i.e. defense verdicts), while case expected values 
include zeros.  
 134. The 95% confidence interval predicted that raw damages in scenario 3 could 
be $116,311 lower to $10,025 higher than in scenario 1. 
 135. The 95% confidence interval predicted that raw damages in scenario 4 could 
be $67,589 lower to $60,477 higher than in scenario 1.  
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3.  Contributory Negligence (Snowboard) 
When plaintiffs are found to be contributorily negligent, their damages 
awards are reduced by the percentage of fault.  A comparison of Scenarios 1 
and 2 suggests that evidence of subsequent remedial measures might be in-
creasing findings of contributory negligence.  Finding that the plaintiff also 
bears some responsibility for an injury might be another way for juries to ex-
press approval for a defendant that takes corrective actions. 
Table 3 shows that as evidence of subsequent remedial measures was in-
troduced in Scenario 2, the rate of contributory negligence findings increased 
from 31.0% to 46.4% (39/84).  That rate remained substantially unchanged at 
47.6% when the simple limiting jury instruction was introduced in Scenario 3.  
But the rate of contributory negligence dropped to 29.4% (20/68) when the 
more limiting instruction with explanation was introduced in Scenario 4.  Our 
regression analysis showed that these differences were not quite statistically 
significant.136 
There were, however, significant demographic effects based on income 
and race.  For every step increase on our income scale, respondents were more 
likely to find that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent (odds ratio to 1, 
p=.032).  At the same time, African American respondents were less likely than 
white respondents to find that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent (odds 
ratio to 1, p=.022). 
4.  Net Damages (Snowboard) 
Both raw damages awards and findings of contributory negligence 
trended in directions helpful to the defendant when evidence of remedial effects 
were introduced.  But neither result reached statistical significance.137  This 
caused us to examine the combined effects of these two outcomes.  We call this 
net damages.  Net damages exclude defendant wins and reflect the fact that 
awards plaintiffs eventually receive are reduced when there are findings of con-
tributory negligence.   
The regression analysis for net damages did show statistically significant 
differences.  Damages in Scenario 2 decreased by $62,690 (p=.043) when evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures was introduced.138  The simple limiting 
  
 136. See infra app. B at Table B3. Comparing scenario 1 vs 2, the odds ratio was 
1.822 to 1 (p=.105).   
 137. We also examined whether the percent fault attributed to plaintiff varied when 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures was introduced.  We saw no evidence of this 
effect and therefore do not report the numerical results here. Because this analysis only 
looks at plaintiff wins with findings of contributory negligence, our study was inade-
quately powered to study this question well.  
 138. See infra app. B, Table B4.  Our bootstrap confidence interval showed similar 
results.  There was 95% likelihood that net damages in Scenario 2 was between 
$124,753 and $653 lower than scenario 1.   
35
Chao and Santos: How Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures Matters
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
644 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol.  84 
instruction introduced in Scenario 3 did not change this effect.  Net damages 
were still $66,780 less than Scenario 1 (p=.039).139  Interestingly, when we 
introduced the jury instruction with explanation in Scenario 4, the effect ap-
peared to substantially disappear.  In our model, net damages in Scenario 4 
were only $4,393 less than Scenario 1.140  Thus, it appears that defendants were 
able to reduce net damages by taking subsequent remedial measures.  Oddly, a 
limiting jury instruction with an explanation of the basis for Rule 407 returned 
net damages to baseline.  
5.  Case Expected Value (Snowboard) 
Table 4 above reports on the case expected value for each different sce-
nario.  Interestingly, the case expected value did not vary much between sce-
narios.  In Scenario 1, the case expected value was $91,851.  As evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures was introduced in Scenario 2, the case expected 
value increased to $98,567.  The value dropped a small amount to $94,718 as 
the simple limiting instruction was added in Scenario 3.  The highest case ex-
pected value, $108,744, was found when the limiting instruction with explana-
tion was used in Scenario 4.  However, our regression analysis suggested that 
none of these differences were statistically significant. 
The only significant effects were related to demographics.  The case ex-
pected value decreased $47,388 when males were mock jurors as opposed to 
females (p=.00013) and increased $54,286 when African American respond-
ents decided the case as opposed to white respondents. 
6.  Findings 
We draw several conclusions from Experiment 2.  First, Experiment 2 
confirmed that evidence of subsequent remedial measures increased plaintiff’s 
win rate.  Although the impact was smaller than we saw in Experiment 1, it 
was still sizable and significant.  Interestingly, when the mock jurors saw evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures, the plaintiff’s win rate increased but 
net damages decreased.  Although we certainly cannot identify the causal 
mechanism, it may well be that the defendant’s decision to take remedial 
measures made them less blameworthy and therefore deserving of smaller 
damages.  Because liability and damages went in opposite directions, we saw 
no statistically significant differences between any of our scenarios when we 
examined case expected value. 
  
 139. See supra Table 4. The 95% confidence interval looked substantially like it 
did for Scenario 2.  Net damages for Scenario 2 was between $128,041 and $3,419 
lower than scenario 1.   
 140. Id. The 95% confidence interval suggested that net damages in Scenario 4 
could be anywhere between $68,477 lower and $59,308 higher than Scenario 1. 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
In this section, we discuss what our results mean for policymakers, litiga-
tors, and future researchers.  As part of this discussion, we describe the limita-
tions of our work. 
A.  Implications 
1.  Policymakers  
Our results confirm that evidence of subsequent remedial measures sub-
stantially increases the likelihood that a defendant will be found liable.  The 
size of the effect varied in our two experiments.  Important differences in the 
two experiments likely caused this variance.  First, in the staircase experiment, 
two cognitive mechanisms were likely at work, but one of these mechanisms 
was not present in the snowboard experiment.  In both experiments, evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures likely suggested that the defendant should 
have taken the action earlier.  This is the kind of hindsight bias that often jus-
tifies Rule 407.  But in the staircase experiment, the evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures (a new staircase with a landing) was introduced by the 
plaintiff in a separate rebuttal that focused on impeaching the defendant’s ar-
gument of lack of feasibility (space was too limited for such a staircase).  By 
contrast in our snowboard experiment, the evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures was introduced in the plaintiff’s case in chief to suggest that there 
was a safer snowboard design (pre-drilled holes).  This evidence did not place 
defendant’s credibility at issue in the same way as the staircase experiment.  
This might explain why the effect of evidence of subsequent remedial measures 
was larger in the staircase experiment.  Alternatively, the difference in effect 
size might be attributable to the particular subsequent remedial measure found 
in each case or even case specific facts. 
Our results also suggest that limiting jury instructions can reduce, but not 
eliminate, the effect of subsequent remedial measures on liability findings.   
Moreover, consistent with Diamond and Casper,141 the instruction that ex-
plained the basis for Rule 407 appeared to be more effective than the simple 
instruction.  But our conclusions about limiting instructions are tentative at 
best.  While the results trended in directions consistent with our hypotheses, 
the only difference that reached statistical significance was found in the stair-
case experiment.  The difference in liability rates of the jury instruction with 
explanation and the scenario where subsequent remedial measures were intro-
duced but no limiting instruction was given was significant.142  Moreover, the 
difference between the simple limiting jury instruction and the instruction with 
  
 141. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra Part II.E.1 for the precise statistical analysis and infra Table 1 for 
an intuitive understanding of this effect. 
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explanation was only suggestive and did not reach statistical significance in 
either of our two experiments. 
Unfortunately, these results do not provide clear answers for judges.  The 
problem is that no one knows precisely how much weight jurors should give to 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures when deciding liability.  If a judge 
believes that jurors should give some limited weight to evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures, then it may make sense to admit the evidence and provide 
a limiting instruction with an explanation of the basis of the rule.  If the judge 
believes that the evidence deserves more weight, the judge can issue a simple 
instruction instead.  On the other hand, if the judge believes that the evidence 
has no value, our results suggest that limiting instructions will be unable to 
counteract the entire effect that evidence of subsequent remedial measures has 
on liability decisions.  But the problem with all these recommendations is that 
our results merely point in directions and do not give precise estimates.  More-
over, even if these estimates were more precise, different facts undoubtedly 
would change these estimates. 
Damages effects complicate this picture even further.  In the snowboard 
experiment, damages decreased and essentially counteracted the increased 
findings of liability.143  That result did not happen in the staircase experiment.  
It is unclear how, or even if, courts should take into account how evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures affects damages.  Perhaps, admitting evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures might actually incentivize corrective action 
because it will lower damage awards. 
2.  Litigants 
Our results confirm the widely held notion that evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures leads jurors to find defendants liable at a higher rate.144  
That might suggest that defendants should be wary about taking remedial 
measures.  But there are two reasons why this concern might be overstated.  
First, jury instructions appear to reduce these liability effects.145  Moreover, an 
instruction that explains the basis for Rule 407 appears to be slightly more ef-
fective than a simple jury instruction.146  We provide this recommendation with 
an important caveat.  For the most part, our results on jury instructions did not 
reach statistical significance, but only suggested possible trends.  Researchers 
certainly will not (and should not) accept these findings as conclusive.  But at 
this point, there is no other data for litigants to consider.  Second, and perhaps 
more surprising, evidence of remedial measures might actually reduce a de-
fendant’s damages.147  This effect was present (and statistically significant) in 
  
 143. See supra Part III, Table 3, Table 4, and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra Table 1, Table 3, and accompanying text. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See supra Table 2, Table 4, and accompanying text. 
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the snowboard experiment, but not the staircase experiment.  So how is a liti-
gant to use this information?  We suspect that damages will only decrease if 
the specific remedial measures at issue make the defendant look like a good 
citizen.  At this point, we cannot prove that this is the mechanism for lower 
damages awards, however, this hypothesis is consistent with other studies that 
found that juries award higher damages when the conduct was more blamewor-
thy.148 
For plaintiffs, evidence of subsequent remedial measures appears helpful 
on liability. Thus, if liability is hotly contested, a plaintiff’s attorney should 
attempt to find an exception to introduce evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures.  On the other hand, if liability is straightforward and the real dispute 
lies in the proper amount of damages, a plaintiff’s attorney may want to steer 
clear of presenting such evidence as it may lead to a lower damages award.  
Obviously, defense attorneys should consider the opposite approach.  In addi-
tion, if evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admitted, they should ask 
for a limiting instruction that explains the basis underlying Rule 407. 
3.  Researchers 
With one notable exception, our study did not provide entirely consistent 
results.  That is probably because cases in our legal system are complex and 
decision-making often depends on the particular facts being tested.  The stair-
case and snowboard experiments provide a good example of how the same 
kinds of decisions can take place in very different contexts.  The two experi-
ments had very different accused tortious acts (steep stairs vs. defective bind-
ing).  The plaintiffs were also engaged in very different activities (walking 
down stairs vs. extreme snowboarding).  The defendants took different subse-
quent remedial measures (rebuilding staircase vs. redesigning binds).  Proce-
durally, the evidence of subsequent remedial measures was introduced at dif-
ferent stages in the case.  Thus, it should come as no surprise that the results in 
these experiments differed.  Unfortunately, that means the researcher’s role is 
not easy.  To the extent any study suggests particular insights, the results needs 
to be tested in different contexts to determine how well the insight holds up 
when combined with different factors.  It’s quite likely that there are factors 
that may interact in ways that enhance, reduce, or even eliminate many such 
findings. 
While most studies have suggested that mock jurors are unable to disre-
gard information on command, particularly when the instruction suggests that 
they only ignore evidence for one purpose but not another, our results were not 
consistent with this view.  Even though we only had a single statistically sig-
nificant finding, three of our four results suggested that limiting instructions 
  
 148. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
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had the desired effect, albeit modestly.149  While our results were not conclu-
sive, they seemed to suggest that a limiting instruction with an explanation of 
the instruction’s purpose can have some of the desired effect. Thus, our result 
appears to support Casper and Diamond’s findings.150 
Our experiment was not designed to identify the precise mechanism be-
hind this effect.  Surely individuals cannot delete evidence from their 
thoughts.151  However, if jurors believe that the limiting instruction makes good 
sense, they may try to make up for the inability to forget the evidence by simply 
putting a thumb on the scale in the other direction.  If we consider this possi-
bility in terms of the Hans-Reyna gist based model of decision-making, a lim-
iting instruction could cause a juror to simply lower the degree of defendant’s 
fault on the ordinal scale.  Future researchers might want to explore this possi-
bility. 
B.  Limitations  
Our study had several limitations.  First, two experiments exposed mock 
jurors to one of several different scenarios.  The effects we tested may be mod-
erated or enhanced by different arguments and presentations.  We did not test 
how different arguments or presentation graphics might change our results.  For 
example, our first experiment involved a moderate injury involving stairs, but 
an example with more serious injuries involving a more complex mechanism 
for injury, such as a car, may have different effects on juries and how they 
perceive subsequent remedial measures.  Further, our findings from version 
one and two (which indicated that the win rate went up slightly for the plaintiff 
when the defendant controverted the feasibility of making the stairs less steep) 
may have been affected by the types of arguments used and may render differ-
ent results with a different style or argument.  Indeed, just within our study, we 
found several effects that were only found in one experiment.  For example, 
we found that older people tended to award more damages in the staircase ex-
periment, but not the snowboard experiment.152  Similarly, African Americans 
viewed liability differently in snowboard experiment than whites, but race ef-
fects were not present in the staircase experiment.153  This suggests that other 
  
 149. In the staircase experiment, the limiting instruction with explanation yielded a 
statistically significant decrease in plaintiff’s win rate (p=.0022) and the simple limiting 
instruction was trending in that direction (p=.098).  In the snowboard experiment, the 
limiting instruction with explanation also trended in the same direction (p=.28).  Ad-
mittedly, a fourth result, the simple limiting instruction in the snowboard experiment, 
did not see almost any change in plaintiff’s win rate (p=.76). 
 150. See Diamond & Casper, supra notes 74 and accompanying text. 
 151. See SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 64, at 89 (suggesting that one reason jurors 
do not disregard information is because they cannot wipe it from their memory). 
 152. See supra Part II.E.2. 
 153. See supra Part III.E.3. 
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unknown factors may be interacting with the variables we were testing.  Put 
more simply, the hypotheses we tested only tell part of a more complex story. 
Second, our experiments were limited to an abridged civil trial that lasted 
from approximately fifteen to seventeen minutes where the jurors could only 
hear the voices of the lawyers, experts, and the judge.  Although the respond-
ents viewed PowerPoint presentations, they were not able to see the attorneys, 
experts, or judge.  Thus, the respondents could not witness the different pre-
senters’ demeanor or consider other visual cues.  This might affect verdicts, but 
this design also had advantages.  Because our experiment consisted of sum-
maries of both parties’ arguments, rather than actually having the jurors listen 
to a full trial in the normal format, we were able to utilize a randomized con-
trolled trial experimental design, which is the gold-standard for scientific re-
search.154  
However, there are still reasonable concerns about external validity.  One 
might expect that the plaintiff’s win rates may be increased or decreased if the 
respondents were to hear more detailed trial evidence.  However, we structured 
the abridged case to give both sides a comparably equal amount of persuasive 
evidence through two different expert witnesses.  Thus, a longer trial with more 
evidence may not have affected the results in any significant way.  Thus, for 
mock jury research, a 15-minute audio stimulus with a PowerPoint presenta-
tion, complete with jury instructions, opening statements, expert witnesses, and 
arguments, is at the high end of the range of external validity, compared to 
other studies which might use a 5-minute paper-and-pencil task. 
Third, we did not study real jurors.  Prior research has shown that “the 
population of Mechanical Turk is at least as representative of the U.S. popula-
tion as traditional subject pools.”155  Known experimental results have been 
replicated using the MTurk population.156  Nonetheless, MTurkers may be 
more easily distracted from the trial compared to real jurors and may even pro-
vide junk responses (e.g., those who failed to watch the entire video without 
hearing all the arguments and rendered a verdict).  It may be that real jurors are 
more earnest in their efforts to providing meaningful responses or that real ju-
rors determine liability differently knowing that the outcomes will impact real 
individuals and companies.  
Lastly, our study involved single jurors and the outcomes they arrived at 
on their own.  Our study did not allow jurors to deliberate with other jurors in 
the manner that would occur if a real trial were conducted.  We are unaware of 
how any such difference would interact with the hypotheses here tested.  More-
  
 154. Leon Gordis, Introduction to Scientific Methodology, 9 KAN. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y, 34, 43–44 (1999) (noting that the randomized trial is the “gold standard” of 
study design and explaining how randomization shields the study from the investiga-
tor’s preconceptions and biases). 
 155. Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 411 (2010). 
 156. See Irvine et al., supra note 90 at 344; Berinsky, supra note 94, at 361–65. 
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over, “Research has consistently shown a strong and robust relationship be-
tween the verdict preferred by the majority of jurors at the start of deliberation 
and the jury’s ultimate verdict.”157  The issue of how juror decisions on dam-
ages predict jury decisions on damages is less developed.  The work that has 
been done suggests that individual juror decisions modestly underestimate 
what juries will decide after deliberation.158  But the point of our experiment is 
to test the difference in damages between experimental conditions, not to esti-
mate absolute values. 
CONCLUSION 
We conducted two large scale experiments to test the assumptions under-
lying Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and how it is applied by the courts.  Unlike 
prior studies, we used longer video vignettes that included arguments from the 
plaintiff and the defendant as well as jury instructions.  Like prior studies, mock 
jurors determined whether the defendant was liable, but unlike any other stud-
ies to date, we also asked mock jurors to decide issues of contributory negli-
gence and damages.  As expected, evidence of subsequent remedial measures 
helped plaintiffs win more often.  But surprisingly, our results also suggested 
that taking remedial measures may lower net damages (damages after consid-
ering contributory negligence) under certain conditions, thereby counteracting 
the increased liability findings.  We also studied the efficacy of two limiting 
jury instructions.  In one experiment, a limiting instruction with an explanation 
reduced but did not eliminate the effects of evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures.  The instructions with explanation were also consistently more ef-





 157. DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE, 158 
(2018); see also Maggie Wittlin, The Results of Deliberation, 15 U.N.H. L. Rev. 161, 
185 (2017) (summarizing studies that show that individual juror decisions are predic-
tive of jury decisions as a whole). 
 158. Id.; see also, Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability 
and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 301, 316–17 (1998) (“jury awards in this case were higher than the average 
mean and median juror awards, a pattern found in several other studies of damage 
awards.”); Diamond & Casper, supra note 74, at 553 (“A clear inflation of damage 
awards occurred between the individual and the group level. On average the juries pro-
duced awards about $56,000 (or 26%) higher than the average of their members prior 
to deliberation.”). 
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APPENDIX A 
Staircase Analyses 
Table A1 shows the results of a regression analysis to find the odds ratio 
of a plaintiff winning on liability.  The (Intercept) value corresponds to the 
odds of finding of liability in the reference case where there was evidence of 
remedial measures but no limiting jury instructions with a white female whose 
age and income are the mean of the sample.  Coefficients for categorical vari-
ables show the odds ratio is situation/demographics are changed from the ref-
erence case.  The ethnicity odd ratios are given relative to the category “White.”  
The gender odds ratio is given relative to the reference category of female.  
Table A1 
Staircase, Liability (Plaintiff Prevailing) 
 
Variable Odds Ratio p value 
Intercept 2.20 0.0000184*** 
No Subsequent Remedial Measures 0.417 0.0000482*** 
Simple Limiting Jury Instruction 0.700 0.0979 ‘.’ 
Limiting Jury Instruction with Explanation 0.611 0.0240 * 
Income 0.812 0.00215 ** 
Age 0.993 0.288 
Gender (Male) 0.912 0.543 
African American 1.369 0.221 
American Indian, Alaska, Native Hawai-
ian, Pacific Islander, and Other 
1.101 0.796 
Asian 1.259 0.412 
Significance codes for all tables:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table A2 
Staircase, Raw Damages 
 
Variable Damages in 
Dollars 
p value 
Intercept 182,882 < 2e-16 *** 
No Subsequent Remedial Measures 655.1 0.950 
Simple Limiting Jury Instruction 3631.7 0.733 
Limiting Jury Instruction with Explanation -14,339 0.189 
Income -3,013 0.370 
Age 1,258 0.000101 *** 
Gender (Male) -2,875 0.700 
African American -10,370 0.373 
American Indian, Alaska, Native Hawai-
ian, Pacific Islander, and Other 
-23,750 0.178 
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Table A3  
Staircase, Case Expected Value 
 
Variable Case Expected 
Value (Dollars) 
p value 
Intercept 86,758 < 2e-16 *** 
No Subsequent Remedial Measures 36,288 0.000639 *** 
Simple Limiting Jury Instruction 25,623 0.0138 * 
Limiting Jury Instruction with Explanation 7,958 0.451 
Income -10,990 0.000955 *** 
Age 440 0.186 
Gender (Male) -7,062 0.349 
African American 5,315 0.670 
American Indian, Alaska, Native Hawaiian, 
Pacific Islander, and Other 
-10,689 0.562 
Asian -170 0.990 
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APPENDIX B 
Snowboard Analyses 
Table B1  
Snowboard, Liability 
 
Variable Odds Ratio p value 
Intercept 1.134 0.520 
No Subsequent Remedial Measures 0.534 0.00531 ** 
Simple Limiting Jury Instruction 0.936 0.758 
Limiting Jury Instruction with  
Explanation 
0.787 0.275 
Income 0.931 0.321 
Age 0.988 0.0906 ‘.’ 
Gender (Male) 0.487 0.00000765 *** 
African American 2.0660 0.00286 ** 
American Indian, Alaska, Native Hawai-
ian, Pacific Islander, and Other 
0.994 0.989 
Asian 1.798 0.0372 * 
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Table B2  
Snowboard, Raw Damages 
 
Variable Damages in 
Dollars 
p value 
Intercept 305,421 <2e-16 *** 
Subsequent Remedial Measures -55,612 0.0763 ‘.’ 
Simple Limiting Jury Instruction -54,055 0.0847 ‘.’ 
Limiting Jury Instruction with Explanation -3,548 0.914 
Income 6,759 0.481 
Gender (Male) -19,639 0.336 
African American 4,844 0.867 
American Indian, Alaska, Native Hawaiian, 
Pacific Islander, and Other 
-15,110 0.799 
Asian -48,569 0.184 
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Table B3  
Snowboard, Contributory Negligence 
 
Variable Odds Ratio p value 
Intercept 0.513 0.0473 * 
Subsequent Remedial Measures 1.822 0.105 
Simple Limiting Jury Instruction 1.863 0.0922  
Limiting Jury Instruction with Explanation 0.842 .669 
Income 1.322 0.0150 * 
African American 0.419 0.0167 * 
American Indian, Alaska, Native Hawaiian, 
Pacific Islander, and Other 
0.324 0.172 
Asian 0.795 0.586 
Male 1.267 0.360 




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/5
2019] SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES 657 
Table B4  
Snowboard, Net Damages 
 




Intercept 279,495 <2e-16 *** 
Subsequent Remedial Measures -62,690 0.0427 * 
Simple Limiting Jury Instruction -66,780 0.0309 * 
Limiting Jury Instruction with Explanation -4,393 0.892 
Income -514 0.957 
African American 20,734 0.467 
American Indian, Alaska, Native Hawaiian, 
Pacific Islander, and Other 
-23,187 0.692 
Asian -52,384 .146 
Male -18,526 0.394 
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Table B5 







Intercept 104,747 1.79e-11 *** 
Subsequent Remedial Measures 12,635 0.464 
Simple Limiting Jury Instruction 4,829 0.778 
Limiting Jury Instruction with Explanation 22,811 0.194 
Income -5,054 0.366 
African American 54,286 0.00465 ** 
American Indian, Alaska, Native Hawaiian, 
Pacific Islander, and Other 
-7,072 0.824 
Asian 12,250 0.580 
Male -47,389 0.000126 *** 
Low Anchor -432 0.972 
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